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Redrawing Boundaries:
The ‘Bloodlands’ as Fact or Artefact?
Peter Luff
Abstract Timothy Snyder is a leading light among scholars engaged in the
study of 20th century central and eastern European history.  His latest book
attempts to convince the reader of the usefulness and aptness of the coinage
‘Bloodlands’ as a way of identifying and describing a discrete historical phenom-
enon, the campaigns of mass murder waged by Hitler and Stalin in a swathe of
the continent running between central Poland and Western Russia in the period
1933-45.  This central claim is examined and found wanting in terms of an
inner consistency in relationship to the unities of time, place and action.  It is
argued, however, that the book still contains much of real value, as for example
in its discussion of Stalinist anti-semitism and the disappearance of the
Holocaust from Soviet accounts of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ after 1945.  The
failure to establish an overarching framework is, then, a significant flaw, but not
sufficiently damaging to wound the endeavor fatally.  
Timothy Snyder. 2010. Bloodlands. Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. New
York, Basic Books. Pp. xix, 524. ISBN 978 0 465 00239 9 (hardback).
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The problem rises up immediately to confront anyone setting out to
write about the past.  History is, famously, a ‘seamless fabric’, material that
never rends itself into pieces single-patterned and of the right size to fit con-
veniently within the covers of a book.  That being so, the historian’s first
and most difficult task is to discern a meaningful shape, to chalk the outline
of a topic on the cloth.  This cannot be done too carefully, for once complet-
ed one must dare to cut, safe in the knowledge that even the sharpest ana-
lytical scissors will leave plenty of rough edges.
In sketching out the lineaments of Bloodlands, Timothy Snyder,
Professor of History at Yale, clearly believed that he had detected a shape in
the past that had eluded all previous observers. He defines its parameters
in clear terms at the very outset (pp. vii-viii).
In the middle of Europe in the middle of the twentieth century, the
Nazi and Soviet regimes murdered some fourteen million people.
The place where all of the victims died, the bloodlands, extends
from central Poland to western Russia, through Ukraine, Belarus,
and the Baltic states...[which witnessed] mass violence of a sort
never before seen in history...The fourteen million were murdered
over the course of only twelve years, between 1933 and 1945, while
both Hitler and Stalin were in power.  Though their homelands
became battlefields midway through this period, these people were
all victims of a murderous policy rather than casualties of war.
At first glance, the claim that between 1933 and 1945, in a clearly
demarcated area of Eastern Europe, an unprecedented campaign of mass
murder aimed at civilians took place certainly appears to satisfy the three
Aristotelian unities of time, place and action.  But Professor Snyder knows
that the validity of his claim to have brought to light a previously unrecog-
nized historical topic must be demonstrated, not just asserted; his book,
then, is designed to ‘test the proposition that deliberate and direct mass
murder by these two regimes in the bloodlands is a distinct phenomenon
worthy of separate treatment’ (p. 411).  How well does his concept pass the
test?
The most compelling evidence presented in its favour comes from the
wartime years, when the tide of fighting gave millions the experience of the
inhuman brutality not just of one dictator but of two, of Hitler and Stalin
both, nominal enemies but brothers in mass murder―a relationship recog-
nized as early as the autumn of 1939 in the famous depiction of the
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact by the British cartoonist, David Low, in which the
two dictators bow to and greet one another across the corpse of Poland.
Professor Snyder’s words on what happened to those in the bloodlands
who found themselves caught in the vicious composite jaws of Hitler and
Stalin deserve close attention.
These Europeans, who inhabited the crucial part of Europe at the
crucial time, were condemned to compare.  We have the possibility,
if we wish, to consider the two systems in isolation; people who
lived under them experienced overlap and interaction.  The Nazi
and Soviet regimes were sometimes allies, as in the joint occupation
of Poland.  They sometimes held compatible goals as foes: as when
Stalin chose not to aid the rebels in Warsaw in 1944, thereby allow-
ing the Germans to kill people who would later have resisted com-
munist rule.  This is what Francois Furet called their “belligerent
complicity.” Often the Germans and the Soviets goaded each other
into escalations that cost more lives than the policies of either state
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by itself would have (p. 392).
Yet even here, where the boundaries seem most sharply defined, just a little
probing reveals them to be in truth blurred and lacking in coherence.  For,
in respect of action, Professor Snyder has restricted the concept of the
‘bloodlands’ quite deliberately to the mass murder of civilians by the Nazis
and Soviets.  This is to define the concept in terms of victims, and only those
who were not bearing arms at the moment of their deaths are to be consid-
ered as such.  But this is simply too arbitrary and unnatural a use of the
word ‘victim’ to be workable, and if it is to be enforced with any strictness,
it leads to distinctions that cannot be defended seriously.  If it is only the act
of killing and the civilian dead themselves that are allowed to define the
‘bloodlands’, then this book has properly nothing to do with the wider
experience of those who survived.  The focus cannot therefore be on the
‘people who lived’ under the two regimes, but on those who died under
them, those whose blood was shed.  And here, by definition, there could
have been no common experience, no grounds for comparison, because no-
one died twice, once under Hitler and a second time under Stalin.  Nor is
this mere quibbling.  There is a book, and a very important one, to be writ-
ten about the experiences of those who could say with Nazedha
Mandelstam, ‘How we scurried about― trapped between Hitler and Stalin.’
But that book will not be called ‘Bloodlands’― something much broader
will be needed, a concept that makes room for the terror and utter hopeless-
ness that even those who survived experienced when they realized how
inescapably they were caught between two inhuman forces.  Professor
Snyder does himself venture onto this wider territory at points and has
much to say about it that is of interest and value, but in so doing he is
forced to abandon any notion that he is testing a proposition that the ‘blood-
lands’ is a ‘distinctive phenomenon’.
It is in fact difficult to avoid concluding that the term ‘bloodlands’ was
coined less for its explanatory than for its dramatic, emotive qualities.  It
may well be that these qualities alone will ensure that it becomes an accept-
ed part of the historical terminology used to describe mid-20th century
Europe, but this does not disguise the fact that events cannot be made to fit
neatly inside it.  Take just one example, that of the Warsaw Uprising, cited
by Professor Snyder above as a clear instance of the ‘belligerent complicity’
of Hitler and Stalin.  The Uprising certainly belongs to the ‘bloodlands’ in
terms of time and space, but not in terms of action.  For it was in large mea-
sure an armed conflict, not simply a massacre of defenceless civilians
(though it was that as well).  Is there really any overmastering need to frac-
ture the unity of that event, to discriminate between two categories of the
dead, those who fought in the Home Army with weapons and in uniform,
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and those who had neither and did not fight (predominantly women and
children).  If the combatants are not to be admitted to the total of the 14 mil-
lion in the company of those whom they died in part to defend, if they were
somehow not also victims on an equal footing, a very compelling case must
be made, and it is not made here.  Why cannot the members of the Home
Army who died be said to be part of the story of the ‘bloodlands’?  And
indeed, when he come to give his own account of the Uprising (pp. 298-
310), Professor Snyder rightly avoids any such artificial distinction, choos-
ing instead to follow in the footsteps of much fuller studies such as that by
Norman Davies.  In so doing, however, his proclaimed theme disappears
from view entirely― to the point where his concluding remark on the
episode (p. 310) is that ‘Stalin’s cynical treatment of the Home Army was a
slap in the face to his British and American allies.  In this sense the Warsaw
Uprising was the beginning of the confrontation that was to come when the
Second World War was over.’  An observation of real insight and interest―
but what has it to do with the ‘bloodlands’?
So the unity of action fractures―Bloodlands cannot be said to pass that
aspect of the test Professor Snyder sets for it.  Something of the same order
happens to the unity of time.  For Professor Snyder wishes to include the
Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33 within the framework of his envisaged theme.
This is to invite serious problems, some of them foreseen by the author, oth-
ers perhaps not.  We have quoted Professor Snyder to the effect that it is the
central feature of the ‘bloodlands’ that its 14 million victims ‘were mur-
dered over the course of only twelve years, between 1933 and 1945, while
both Hitler and Stalin were in power.’  But the overwhelming proportion of
the victims of the Holodomor (Professor Snyder eschews using the term itself
on the grounds that ‘it is unfamiliar to almost all readers of English’ (p. 412),
though he is happy to employ ‘bloodlands’, a term unfamiliar to every sin-
gle one of them) died before ever the Nazis seized control of the govern-
ment of Germany.  Norman Naimark, in his recent study of Stalin’s
Genocides, is simply adverting to a very well-known fact when he remarks
(p. 75) that at the beginning of 1933, when Stalin finally decided to allow
minimal famine relief to the Ukraine, it ‘was too little, too late; millions had
already died, and thousands more deaths would follow.’  So again we are
faced with questions that seem not worth the asking.  Do those thousands of
death alone belong to the ‘bloodlands’, since only they occurred after Hitler
became Chancellor on 30th January, 1933?  How can they meaningfully be
distinguished from the millions who had gone before them?  Clearly they
cannot― even for Professor Snyder they are part of the 14 million, and
rightly so.  But their inclusion is only possible if one abandons a time frame
when Hitler and Stalin were both in power, and once that parameter is
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breached, where and on what grounds does one draw the new line?  1930?
But why not go further back, as Solzhenitsyn and others have done, to the
Russian Civil War that followed on from the Bolshevik seizure of power in
1917 and in which peasants were deliberately targeted for extermination on
the grounds of class.  From this perspective the years 1922-29 were simply a
truce, the Holodomor a resumption of war.  But following that line of thought
means that it is not simply the time frame of the ‘bloodlands’ that will have
been distorted beyond recognition, but its final unity too, that of place―
because the peasants who were slaughtered between 1917 and 1922 did not
live in the Ukraine alone.
For all that, it is the unity of place that emerges from the ‘bloodlands’
test the least damaged―unsurprisingly, of course, since these are blood-
lands, which gives the geographical dimension implicit priority.  Even here,
though, the walls do not hold, for Professor Snyder includes a chapter on
‘class terror’ (pp. 59-87) which in providing a summary of the ‘Great Terror’
of 1937-38 inevitably treats of the entire Soviet Union, including the Far
East, some thousands of miles from the ‘bloodlands’.  He follows this with a
chapter on ‘national terror’ which details the cruel fate of a multitude of
Polish citizens at the hands of the NKVD in 1937-38.  Here we would seem
to be back in the ‘bloodlands’, and certainly the mass arrests and executions
did take place predominantly in Belarus and the Ukraine.  But Russian cities
like Leningrad also contributed their share― should these Poles therefore
really be counted amongst the 14 million, any more than the exiled
Ukrainian ‘kulaks’ who perished in such large number in Siberia after 1933.
And what of the tens of thousands who died in the construction of the
White Sea Canal, and the many tens and hundreds of thousands more
Gulag victims scattered across the length and breadth of the Soviet Union?
What purpose is really served by trying to separate and shuffle them off to
one side?
All in all, then, the term ‘bloodlands’ does not illuminate very much; to
employ it systematically requires us to sever too many connections, and on
grounds that do not bear close scrutiny.  Yet this does not mean that
Bloodlands has nothing to teach― far from it.  The fact that the whole is less
than the sum of its parts does not render some, though not all, of those parts
of great interest and value.  Prominent among the jewels of understanding,
to take just one example, is the extended treatment of Stalinist anti-Semitism
and what inevitably flowed from the decision to construct the official Soviet
narrative of 1941-45 on the foundation that ‘the Russian nation had strug-
gled and suffered like no other...[meaning that] Russians would have to be
the greatest victors and the greatest victims, now and forever’ (p. 341).  With
this as a given, the fact of the Holocaust could only create insoluble ‘ideo-
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logical’ problems for the Soviet dictator during and especially after the war.
Professor Snyder is entirely right to argue that Stalinist mythmaking was
therefore bound to downplay and then to airbrush from the record Hitler’s
annihilation of the Jews.  It was unavoidable, given that ‘The Jewish
tragedy...could not be enclosed within the Soviet experience...[because]
more Jewish civilians were murdered in absolute terms than members of
any other Soviet nationality...[and because] more than half of the cataclysm
took place beyond the postwar boundaries of the Soviet Union... Precisely
because extermination was a fate common to Jews across borders, its recol-
lection could not be reduced to that of an element in the Great Patriotic
War’ (p. 335).  The truth, indeed any mention at all, of this central event had
therefore to be suppressed immediately.
The inherent insanity that characterized the Stalinist rewriting of histo-
ry has been a familiar topic ever since George Orwell’s 1984, of course.  But
we are truly in Professor Snyder’s debt for a remarkably clear account of
how the ‘logic’ of this process worked itself out in a way that produced the
most astounding of travesties―parodies of the past that can only be
explained by a determined desire to hide completely the ‘belligerent con-
spiracy’ of the two dictators. 
The whole Soviet idea of the Great Patriotic War was premised on
the view that the war began in 1941, when Germany invaded the
Soviet Union, not in 1939, when Germany and the Soviet Union
together invaded Poland.  In other words, in the official story, the
territories absorbed as a result of Soviet aggression in 1939 had to
be considered as somehow always having been Soviet, rather than
as the booty of a war that Stalin had helped Hitler to begin...
No Soviet account of the war could note one of its central facts:
German and Soviet occupation together was worse than German
occupation alone.  The population east of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
line, subject to one German and two Soviet occupations, suffered
more than any other region of Europe.  From a Soviet perspective,
all of the deaths in that zone could simply be lumped together with
Soviet losses, even though the people in question had been Soviet
citizens for only a matter of months when they died, and even
though many of them were killed by the NKVD rather than the SS
[!]...
The vast losses suffered by Soviet Jews were mostly the deaths of
Jews in lands just invaded by the Soviet Union...[They] were the
first to be reached by the Einsatzgruppen when Hitler betrayed
Stalin and Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941.  They had
been shielded by the Soviet press from knowledge of German poli-
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cies towards Jews of 1939 and 1940.  They had virtually no time to
evacuate because Stalin had refused to believe in a German inva-
sion.  They had been subject to terror and deportation in the
enlarged Soviet Union in 1939-41 when Stalin and Hitler were
allied, and then terribly exposed to German forces by the breaking
of that alliance.  These Jews in this small zone made up more than a
quarter of the total victims of the Holocaust.
If the Stalinist notion of the war was to prevail, the fact that the Jews
were its main victims had to be forgotten... (pp. 344-45).
Paragraphs such as these alone are worth the price of the book.  The
truth and the insights they contain more than compensate for the distraction
caused by the coining of the term ‘bloodlands’.  They remind us that
‘Holocaust denial’ can take more than one form, that facts can be ignored
even more effectively than they can be contradicted.  They teach something
of how impossible, setting aside for one moment the fact of terror, it must
have been to live in the Soviet Union under Stalin when any notion of ‘reali-
ty’ was attacked so ruthlessly and where only ignorance and lies were
offered in its place.  They help us to understand why so many of the Jews
remaining in the Soviet Empire after 1945 were so intent on leaving for
Israel, where they would be able to speak freely and openly about their
experience.  Passages such as these offer copious material for thought and
reflection.
Perhaps the chapter on Stalinist anti-semitism would have served bet-
ter as the point of departure for a longer and more narrowly focussed study
of the way in which the Holocaust was treated in the Soviet Union down to
its collapse.  That is in essence the problem with Bloodlands. It is a quarry
from which a number of books could have been hewn, something that did
not happen because of a misguided preoccupation with the single coinage
of its title.  It remains, nonetheless, a book of many virtues. Providing only
that the prospective reader is warned not to expect to find a satisfying inner
coherence among its various parts, it is a work warmly to be commended.
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